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Asymmetric collaborative governance in Indonesia's new capital: A quasi–public–private partnership approach to regional financial institution engagement

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ABSTRACT

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES: This study examined the implementation of the BPD Kaltimtara headquarters project in Indonesia's New Capital City (*Ibu Kota Nusantara*/IKN) as a pioneering quasi-public-private partnership (quasi-PPP) model. Unlike conventional PPPs that emphasize formal risk-sharing and standardized regulation, this initiative reflected an adaptive, trust-based collaboration among actors with asymmetrical resources and authority. The research aimed to describe actor collaboration patterns, assess adaptive coordination mechanisms addressing regulatory uncertainty, and evaluate intermediate outcomes in institutional trust, financial commitment, and project readiness.
METHODS: A descriptive qualitative design with an exploratory orientation was employed. Data were collected from February to July 2025 through four integrated techniques: in-depth interviews with ten key informants, one focus group discussion involving eight participants, participatory observation of coordination meetings and project sites, and comprehensive documentary analysis. Institutional trust was measured using a 5-point Likert scale, financial commitment was verified through internal capital budgeting documents, and project readiness was assessed across five critical dimensions. Data were analyzed using the interactive model of Miles *et al*., (2014) with four triangulation strategies to ensure credibility, transferability, dependability, and confirmability following Lincoln and Guba's (1985) criteria.
FINDINGS: The study revealed five operational principles of asymmetric collaborative governance: complementary asymmetry, adaptive coordination, shared value creation, flexible accountability, and iterative trust building. Quantitatively, the project achieved a trust index of 4.2 (provincial government–BPD) and 3.1 (IKN Authority–partnership). BPD Kaltimtara financed 100% of the IDR 85 billion investment, reallocating 8% of its annual capital budget. Despite regulatory delays, the partnership achieved full technical design completion, environmental assessment approval, and institutional alignment through adaptive coordination mechanisms led by the *Tim Percepatan* IKN Kaltim task force.
CONCLUSION: The findings demonstrate that asymmetric collaborative governance, anchored in shared value creation and adaptive coordination, enables regional institutions to sustain strategic infrastructure development under uncertainty. This quasi-PPP model offers theoretical insights for governance innovation and practical guidance for designing flexible, trust-based frameworks in decentralized and polycentric development environments.

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INTRODUCTION

The implementation of development policy is a critical component of achieving national strategic objectives, particularly within the framework of decentralization and the evolving paradigms of public administration. Policy implementation should not be perceived as a purely technical process but as a complex interaction between vision, institutional capacity, and stakeholder collaboration (Elander, 2002; McAllister & Taylor, 2015; Joniškienė *et al*., 2020). Its effectiveness is largely determined by socio-political and institutional contexts (Hamas & Salahudin, 2021; Madubun & Madubun, 2023). In Indonesia, decentralization has granted regional governments greater autonomy in development management, prompting the need for adaptive and collaborative governance models such as the Public–Private Partnership (PPP) framework (Grimsey & Lewis, 2004; Yescombe, 2017). Within the paradigm of New Public Governance (Osborne, 2010), PPPs are understood not merely as financial mechanisms but as collaborative institutions that integrate efficiency, accountability, and trust between sectors (Ansell & Gash, 2010; Emerson *et al*., 2012; Hodge & Greve, 2017). The development of *Ibu Kota Nusantara* (IKN), Indonesia's new capital city, represents a strategic application of this paradigm. The relocation from Jakarta to East Kalimantan was motivated by environmental degradation, uncontrolled urban expansion, and interregional inequality (April Gunawan Malau *et al*., 2024; Pangestu *et al*., 2024; Syailendra & Hanggono, 2024). Envisioned as a green, smart, and inclusive city, IKN embodies the state's ambition to implement a new governance model through public–private collaboration. One of its early flagship projects is the construction of the Head Office of *Bank Pembangunan Daerah* (BPD) Kaltimtara, a regionally financed development that symbolizes local participation in a nationally strategic initiative (Sari & Naftali, 2024). Beyond its function as a financial service facility, the building represents a manifestation of regional ownership in the national development process through collaborative means.
Betang and Kalimantan's endemic vegetation reflects local identity and environmental harmony.
The presence of BPD Kaltimtara in IKN extends beyond technocratic objectives; it carries symbolic, political, and socio-cultural significance. As a regionally owned financial institution, BPD is embedded in local socio-economic contexts, allowing it to develop tailored financial schemes such as MSME credit programs and green economy financing (Barca *et al*., 2012; Bryson *et al*., 2024). Despite the increasing application of PPPs, academic studies in Indonesia remain focused on contractual and regulatory aspects, emphasizing risk allocation and compliance (Grimsey & Lewis, 2004; Hodge & Greve, 2017). Few studies have examined quasi-PPP models of hybrid partnerships involving regional or semi-public entities such as BUMDs that blur the boundaries between state and market actors. These arrangements operate under institutional ambiguity and asymmetrical authority, demanding new governance approaches that remain under-theorized. Conventional PPP frameworks generally assume symmetrical risk-sharing and balanced power among partners (Li *et al*., 2024; Maqbool & Sridhar, 2024). In contrast, the IKN context is characterized by marked asymmetry among the central government, the IKN Authority, regional governments, BPD Kaltimtara, and local communities, each possessing different levels of authority, resources, and influence. Such asymmetries are not anomalies but structural realities requiring adaptive and inclusive governance. Existing models of collaborative and network governance (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Emerson *et al*., 2012; Osborne, 2010) provide valuable insights into participatory processes and mutual trust but insufficiently explain how effective collaboration can persist when power differentials are inherent and persistent. Furthermore, social and cultural dimensions such as local legitimacy, indigenous design, and environmental sensitivity remain underexplored in PPP evaluations (Beatley, 2012; Bibri & Krogstie, 2019). The BPD Kaltimtara project, incorporating Rumah Betang architectural principles and local vegetation, demonstrates a place-based governance approach that integrates cultural identity with modern functionality and sustainability. Existing studies on PPPs in developing economies have underscored the importance of contractual balance and risk-sharing for project viability (Li *et al*., 2024; Maqbool & Sridhar, 2024). Meanwhile, state capitalism research (Musacchio & Lazzarini, 2014; Mazzucato, 2018) has shown that public institutions can lead strategic investments even under uncertainty. Yet, few studies have analyzed how regional financial institutions or BUMDs act as autonomous investors in national megaprojects without state guarantees. Similarly, while adaptive

Fig. 1: Architectural design of the BPD Kaltimtara Headquarters in IKN, inspired by the traditional Rumah

governance literature (Folke *et al*., 2005; Ansell & Torfing, 2022) demonstrates how local institutions compensate for regulatory gaps, empirical evidence of such mechanisms in quasi-PPP infrastructure contexts remains scarce. Place-based governance studies (Barca *et al*., 2012; Beatley, 2012) have shown that projects aligned with territorial identity gain stronger social legitimacy, but their integration within asymmetric, multi-actor governance systems remains underexplored. In summary, a significant research gap exists in understanding how quasi-PPP models function in decentralized governance systems characterized by regulatory uncertainty, resource asymmetry, and complex stakeholder networks. The case of the BPD Kaltimtara Headquarters in IKN provides an opportunity to examine how regional institutions operationalize strategic collaboration and maintain institutional trust under such conditions. To address this gap, this study adopts the Asymmetric Collaborative Governance (ACG) framework, which extends collaborative, network, and place-based governance theories by treating asymmetry as a productive design variable. The framework builds on five principles: Complementary Asymmetry, where differences in capacity are leveraged as assets; Adaptive Coordination, involving flexible mechanisms to manage uncertainty; Shared Value Creation, emphasizing collective rather than equal contributions; Flexible Accountability, adjusting responsibility to actor capacity; and Iterative Trust Building, cultivating trust through incremental engagement. Accordingly, this study pursues three interrelated objectives: (1) to describe patterns of actor collaboration and power relations among the East Kalimantan Provincial Government, BPD Kaltimtara, the IKN Authority, private contractors, and local communities; (2) to examine adaptive coordination mechanisms developed to manage governance fragmentation and regulatory uncertainty; and (3) to evaluate intermediate outcomes reflected in institutional trust, financial commitment, stakeholder alignment, and project readiness. Fieldwork was conducted in IKN and Samarinda between February and July 2025 through in-depth interviews, focus group discussions, participatory observations, and documentary analysis. These approaches provide a comprehensive empirical basis for understanding how asymmetric collaborative governance operates within Indonesia's decentralized development context and contribute to broader theoretical discussions on hybrid governance and quasi-PPP implementation

MATERIALS AND METHODS

Conceptual materials and literature foundation

Public–Private Partnerships (PPPs) have become a central strategy in Indonesia's infrastructure development, particularly as a response to fiscal constraints and the need for enhanced managerial efficiency. Within the 2020–2024 National Medium-Term Development Plan (RPJMN), the Indonesian government explicitly identified PPPs as a key mechanism to bridge the infrastructure financing gap, recognizing that the state budget (APBN) could only meet approximately 37 percent of total national infrastructure needs. The regulatory foundation for PPP implementation is outlined in Presidential

Regulation No. 38 of 2015, which establishes technical guidelines emphasizing value for money and efficiency throughout the project lifecycle. The PPP process in Indonesia consists of four major stages: planning, preparation, transaction, and implementation, each involving activities such as feasibility studies, business case development, partner selection, contract negotiation, and performance monitoring. Successful implementation of PPPs depends heavily on the quality of governance, both in contractual and relational dimensions. Well-structured contracts minimize opportunistic behavior and enhance sustainability, while fair risk-sharing mechanisms improve project viability (Wang *et al*., 2024; Maqbool & Sridhar, 2024). Despite their advantages, conventional PPPs are not always well-suited to Indonesia's complex and decentralized governance landscape. This has led to the emergence of the Quasi-Public-Private Partnership (Quasi-PPP) model, a hybrid form involving semi-public entities such as state-owned enterprises (SOEs), regionally owned enterprises (BUMDs), and public financial institutions. The Quasi-PPP model offers greater flexibility in risk management, financing mechanisms, and local legitimacy. Conceptually, this model draws upon three theoretical foundations. First, hybrid organization theory explains that such entities combine market and state logics in ownership, mission, and management. Second, incomplete contract theory suggests that under high uncertainty, the state should retain residual control over critical infrastructure projects. Third, state capitalism theory (Mazzucato, 2018; Musacchio & Lazzarini, 2014) argues that the state should actively lead the development of strategic sectors and long-term economic transformation. In both PPP and Quasi-PPP contexts, governance requires a shift toward more collaborative and participatory approaches. The collaborative governance framework (Ansell & Torfing, 2022) and the New Public Governance paradigm (Osborne, 2010) highlight the importance of social legitimacy, cross-sectoral participation, and collective decision-making. Collaborative governance engages public institutions and non-state stakeholders in deliberative, consensus-oriented processes (Ansell & Gash, 2008), supported by inclusive institutional design, facilitative leadership, and trust building. While early models often assume equality among actors, later studies (Emerson *et al*., 2012) indicate that collaboration can remain effective even under power imbalances, as long as mutual dependence, complementary resources, and shared accountability exist. To address the limitations of conventional collaboration models, this study adopts the Asymmetric Collaborative Governance (ACG) framework, which views power and resource asymmetry as strategic assets rather than barriers. The ACG framework consists of five interrelated principles: Complementary Asymmetry, which leverages differences in actor capacity as collaborative assets; Adaptive Coordination, which tailors coordination mechanisms to dynamic power relations; Shared Value Creation, which emphasizes collective value rather than equal contributions; Flexible Accountability, which adjusts accountability systems according to actor roles and capacities; and Iterative Trust Building, which nurtures trust through incremental engagement and small wins. This theoretical framework forms the foundation for the study's research design and guides the operationalization of its key analytical constructs.

Research design and methodological approach

This study employed a descriptive qualitative design with an exploratory orientation to gain an in-depth understanding of the Quasi-PPP model implementation in the BPD Kaltimtara headquarters project within the IKN development context. The approach was framed within an interpretive naturalistic paradigm (Babbie, 2014), which views social reality as constructed through actors' perceptions, negotiations, and interactions. This paradigm enables a deeper understanding of governance processes as they unfold in natural settings, shaped by institutional contexts and stakeholder interpretations. The study was structured around three specific objectives aligned with the theoretical framework and data collection design. The first objective was to describe collaboration patterns, including the roles, responsibilities, and power relations among the East Kalimantan Provincial Government, BPD Kaltimtara, the IKN Authority, private contractors, and local communities. The second objective was to assess the adaptive coordination mechanisms used by stakeholders to address regulatory uncertainty, governance fragmentation, and the absence of formal risk-sharing instruments. The third objective was to evaluate the intermediate results achieved in terms of institutional trust, financial commitment, stakeholder alignment, and project readiness. These objectives correspond directly to three of the ACG framework's key principles Complementary Asymmetry (Objective 1), Adaptive Coordination (Objective 2), and Iterative Trust Building combined with Shared Value Creation (Objective 3).

Research context and site selection

Fieldwork was conducted in two main locations: the IKN development area in East Kalimantan and the city of Samarinda, the provincial capital. These sites were purposively selected for their strategic importance in understanding multi-level governance and cross-sector collaboration. The IKN site represents a greenfield area where regulatory frameworks and governance structures are still evolving, offering a unique opportunity to observe institutional emergence and adaptive arrangements. Samarinda, as the base of provincial administration and the location of BPD Kaltimtara's headquarters, provided access to key decision-makers and documentary evidence. The study covered the planning and pre-construction phases between February and July 2025, enabling observation of early-stage collaboration dynamics and trust-building processes under regulatory uncertainty. The BPD Kaltimtara headquarters project was chosen as a concrete example of Quasi-PPP implementation. Its architectural design, which integrates traditional Rumah Betang elements and local vegetation, reflects the place-based governance approach central to the study's conceptual framework and embodies the fusion of cultural identity with modern infrastructure requirements.

Data collection methods and operationalization

Four integrated data collection techniques were used to address the research objectives and operationalize the constructs of the ACG framework: in-depth interviews, trust index assessment, focus group discussion (FGD), participatory observation, and documentary analysis. In-depth interviews were conducted with ten purposively selected informants representing diverse stakeholder groups, including BPD executives, provincial officials, consultants, community leaders, MSME actors, environmental activists, academics, residents near the IKN site, and religious leaders. Conducted between February and March 2025, interviews lasted between 45 and 90 minutes and followed semi-structured protocols, allowing for both consistency and flexibility. Questions focused on each informant's role, perception of collaboration, conflict resolution mechanisms, and trust relationships. All interviews were audio-recorded with informed consent and transcribed verbatim. Institutional trust was measured during interviews using a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (no trust) to 5 (complete trust). Respondents rated their confidence in each actor's commitment and capability. The average trust score between the provincial government and BPD Kaltimtara was indicating high confidence, while the trust score between the IKN Authority and local partners was reflecting lower levels of communication and coordination. Quantitative results were supported by qualitative evidence on trust-building and institutional reliability. An FGD held on 5 July 2025 brought together eight representatives from regional government, BPD Kaltimtara, private contractors, NGOs, indigenous communities, and academia. Facilitated by an independent moderator, the FGD served as a forum for open deliberation, allowing the articulation of differing views, negotiation of meaning, and potential consensus-building. The discussion was recorded and summarized to validate interview findings and assess levels of stakeholder alignment. Participatory observation involved direct attendance at coordination meetings, site visits, and informal interactions among project stakeholders. Field notes documented verbal and non-verbal communication, decision-making processes, and contextual details. Observation of the Tim Percepatan IKN Kaltim meetings revealed adaptive coordination practices, including the use of three scenario-based planning models (optimistic, realistic, and pessimistic) to manage regulatory uncertainty. Documentary analysis encompassed policy documents such as Law No. 3 of 2022 on the Capital City of the Archipelago, the IKN blueprint, BPD Kaltimtara's financial statements (2024–2025), architectural designs, environmental impact assessments, and meeting records. Financial data analysis revealed that the BPD Kaltimtara headquarters project had a total investment commitment of IDR 85 billion, financed entirely (100 percent) from internal capital, with 8 percent of the bank's annual capital budget reallocated to support the project.

Data analysis procedures

Data were analyzed following the interactive model of Miles, Huberman, and Saldaña (2014), consisting of data condensation, data display, and conclusion drawing. During data condensation, interview transcripts and field notes were reviewed, coded, and categorized according to themes aligned with the research objectives. Coding was performed by multiple researchers to ensure reliability, and both explicit and latent meanings were identified. Data display involved organizing findings into thematic matrices, actor relationship maps, and process diagrams to clarify collaboration patterns, power dynamics, and coordination mechanisms. Conclusion drawing and verification entailed synthesizing empirical findings in relation to the ACG framework and verifying interpretations through member checking and peer discussions.

Validity and trustworthiness

To ensure methodological rigor, the study employed triangulation across methods, sources, investigators, and theories. Method triangulation combined interviews, FGDs, observations, and document analysis to cross-validate findings. Source triangulation incorporated perspectives from various actors to minimize bias. Investigator triangulation involved independent coding by multiple researchers, followed by consensus-building. Theoretical triangulation integrated the Quasi-PPP model, ACG theory, collaborative governance, and place-based development perspectives to provide a multidimensional interpretation. Trustworthiness was further assured through the four criteria proposed by Lincoln and Guba (1985). Credibility was enhanced through prolonged field engagement over five months, triangulation, and member checking. Transferability was ensured through rich contextual description, allowing readers to assess relevance to other cases. Dependability was supported by transparent documentation of data collection, coding procedures, and audit trails. Confirmability was achieved through evidence-based interpretation, inclusion of direct quotations, and reflexive awareness of the researcher's influence on the research process

RESULT AND FINDINGS

Overview of Key Findings

This study analyzed the implementation of the BPD Kaltimtara Headquarters project in Indonesia's New Capital (IKN) as a pioneering quasi-public-private partnership (quasi-PPP) within a decentralized and polycentric governance environment. The research addressed three main objectives: (1) to describe actor collaboration patterns and power relations among key stakeholders; (2) to assess adaptive coordination mechanisms employed to navigate regulatory uncertainty and fragmented governance; and (3) to evaluate intermediate outcomes particularly institutional trust, financial commitment, stakeholder alignment, and project readiness despite the absence of formal site designation by the IKN Authority. The findings reveal that the partnership achieved significant institutional progress despite lacking conventional PPP instruments such as government guarantees, standardized contracts, or formalized risk-sharing frameworks. Instead, progress was enabled by asymmetric but complementary collaboration grounded in the five principles of Asymmetric Collaborative Governance (ACG). Quantitatively, the partnership recorded measurable institutional trust with a 5-point Likert mean of 4.2 (SD = 0.6) for the provincial government–BPD relationship and 3.1 (SD = 0.8) for the IKN Authority partnership relationship. BPD Kaltimtara demonstrated a strong commitment by self-financing 100% of the IDR 85 billion total investment, equivalent to 8% of its annual capital budget, without dependence on the state (APBN) or regional (APBD) budgets. The project also achieved 100% completion of technical designs and environmental assessments, alongside full institutional alignment and strong community endorsement through public consultation.

The BPD Kaltimtara project represents a distinctive quasi-PPP arrangement that deviates from traditional PPP frameworks defined by open bidding, contractual formality, and structured risk sharing (Presidential Regulation No. 38/2015). The partnership was established through a direct assignment from the Governor of East Kalimantan to BPD Kaltimtara, emphasizing political strategy and regional participation rather than purely commercial logic. This model carries symbolic significance by strengthening subnational fiscal autonomy and regional visibility in Indonesia's national development agenda. From a financial perspective, the project's IDR 85 billion investment was fully financed through BPD's internal capital budgeting. The provincial government's contribution focused on political endorsement, land access, and regulatory facilitation. BPD targeted a 12% annual return on investment through fee-

Table 1: *Summary of quantitative institutional indicators: characteristics of the quasi-PPP model*

Indicator	Measurement	Result	Interpretation
Institutional Trust (Prov. Gov.–BPD)	Likert Mean (1–5)	4.2 (SD=0.6)	High confidence and collaboration quality
Institutional Trust (IKN Authority–Partnership)	Likert Mean (1–5)	3.1 (SD=0.8)	Moderate trust; limited coordination with central authority
Financial Commitment	% of total cost self-financed	100% (IDR 85B)	Full internal capital funding by BPD
Annual Budget allocation	% of annual capital budget	8%	Reflects strategic prioritization
Technical Readiness	Design & AMDAL completion	100%	The project is ready for the construction phase

based financial services and credit expansion. Such an arrangement reflects a deliberate asymmetric risk configuration, where BPD assumed full financial exposure while the government provided institutional legitimacy an approach consistent with state capitalism theory (Mazzucato, 2018; Musacchio & Lazzarini, 2014). Interviews revealed that the partnership's resilience stemmed from a 15-year history of collaboration between BPD and the provincial government, creating a foundation of trust and social capital that transcended project boundaries. This hybrid institutional architecture merged financial capital (BPD), political legitimacy (provincial government), and technical expertise (consultants), illustrating Complementary Asymmetry, where differences in capacity are mobilized as collaborative assets rather than constraints.

Patterns of asymmetric collaborative governance

The partnership involved four key actor groups: (1) the East Kalimantan Provincial Government, (2) BPD Kaltimtara, (3) the IKN Authority, and (4) third-party contractors and consultants. Each actor occupied unequal yet interdependent roles. The provincial government served as facilitator and strategic broker, leveraging political authority and coordination capacity. BPD acted as both investor and implementer, bearing total financial responsibility. The IKN Authority retained legal control over land and master plan compliance, while contractors provided specialized technical input. This structure faced a persistent regulatory vacuum; the IKN Authority had yet to define the formal participation of subnational actors such as BUMDs. As a result, implementation relied on horizontal coordination networks rather than hierarchical directives. Informal mechanisms emerged to fill institutional voids, reflecting *Adaptive Coordination* in practice. Rather than being designed ex ante, these collaborative structures evolved organically in response to governance gaps consistent with *collaborative governance theory* (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Osborne, 2010) and the *adaptive governance* approach (Folke *et al*., 2005).

Mechanisms of adaptive coordination

A key innovation was the formation of the Tim Percepatan IKN Kaltim (IKN Acceleration Task Force), an informal yet functional institution comprising representatives from the Provincial Secretariat, Bappeda, BPD Kaltimtara, and occasionally the IKN Authority. The task force met monthly to address coordination bottlenecks, monitor progress, and advocate for policies at higher levels of government. This practice aligns with Adaptive Governance Theory, where local institutions compensate for gaps in formal regulation (Ansell & Torfing, 2022). To mitigate uncertainty regarding land designation, the task force developed three planning scenarios: Optimistic (A), Realistic (B), and Pessimistic (C), each with differentiated timelines, budget strategies, and contingency actions. Scenario planning allowed actors to maintain project readiness despite prolonged delays, operationalizing flexibility central to the ACG framework. Architectural design decisions also reflected adaptive and place-based coordination. The building integrates traditional *Rumah Betang* elements, representing the institution's collective leadership, while passive cooling systems and landscape-sensitive design align with ecological sustainability principles. These choices embody Shared Value Creation, combining technical functionality,

Table 2:*Mapping of ACG principles and empirical manifestations*

ACG Principle	Empirical Manifestation	Supporting Evidence
Complementary Asymmetry	Integration of financial, political, and technical capacities	BPD as investor; province as regulator; consultants as technical experts
Adaptive Coordination	Informal coordination via *Tim Percepatan IKN Kaltim*	Monthly meetings; scenario-based planning
Shared Value Creation	Culturally grounded and community-endorsed design	Integration of *Rumah Betang* architecture; participatory consultation
Flexible Accountability	Resource allocation based on situational needs	8% capital budget reallocation; informal progress monitoring
Iterative Trust Building	Continuity of collaboration and demonstrated reliability	15-year history of joint projects; sustained trust index above 3.5

cultural symbolism, and social acceptance (Barca *et al*., 2012; Beatley, 2012).

This mapping illustrates how the five operational principles of the Asymmetric Collaborative Governance (ACG) framework were empirically manifested in the BPD Kaltimtara–IKN partnership. Rather than functioning as abstract theoretical constructs, each principle was observable through specific institutional mechanisms and behavioral practices that collectively shaped project outcomes. Complementary Asymmetry was expressed through the integration of financial, political, and technical capacities among actors with unequal resources, transforming structural inequality into a source of collaborative advantage. Adaptive Coordination emerged through the establishment of the *Tim Percepatan IKN Kaltim* as an informal governance platform that compensated for regulatory gaps and facilitated scenario-based planning under uncertainty. Shared Value Creation was evident in the incorporation of local cultural and architectural elements that strengthened social legitimacy and public acceptance. Flexible Accountability enabled continuous progress through context-sensitive adjustments to resource allocation and role performance, while Iterative Trust Building was reinforced through a 15-year history of prior cooperation and consistent inter-organizational reliability. Collectively, these manifestations demonstrate that asymmetry, when strategically managed, can generate institutional synergy and sustained collaboration even in complex, decentralized governance environments

Resilience and sustainability factors

Despite the lack of fiscal guarantees and formal PPP safeguards, the partnership displayed remarkable institutional resilience. Five interconnected factors were identified as critical to sustaining collaboration: (1) institutional trust, (2) complementary capabilities, (3) shared strategic interests, (4) flexible resource mobilization, and (5) organizational learning.

Five key factors sustained the BPD Kaltimtara–IKN partnership under regulatory uncertainty. Institutional trust rooted in long-term collaboration ensured continuous engagement, while complementary capabilities and shared strategic interests created interdependence and a unified direction. Flexible resource mobilization through budget and personnel adjustments maintained project momentum, and continuous learning and adaptation strengthened responsiveness and overall institutional resilience

Challenges, dependencies, and mitigation strategies

Although construction has yet to begin due to the IKN Authority's pending site confirmation, the partnership achieved full technical and financial readiness. This distinction between institutional progress and physical progress highlights that effective collaboration can generate measurable outcomes even before project execution.

The challenges summarized above illustrate the multi-dimensional dependencies that shape the progress of the BPD Kaltimtara–IKN partnership. Regulatory uncertainty remains the most critical constraint, driven by delays in land allocation, complex zoning requirements, and overlapping authority between central and regional institutions. These issues highlight the structural dependence on the IKN Authority and reflect broader limitations within Indonesia's multi-level governance system. To mitigate these barriers, the partnership employed proactive political engagement, legal risk reviews, and scenario-based planning that maintained organizational readiness despite regulatory stagnation. Financial risks, although moderate, emerged from the absence of state guar-

Table 3: *Institutional resilience factors and outcomes*

Factor	Operational Mechanism	Outcome
Institutional Trust	Long-term collaboration and social capital	Sustained partnership engagement under uncertainty
Complementary Capabilities	Distinct yet interdependent competencies	Mutual dependence and joint problem-solving
Shared Strategic Interests	Convergence of political, financial, and symbolic goals	Collective motivation and partnership cohesion
Flexible Resource Mobilization	Reallocation of capital and personnel	Maintained project momentum and readiness
Learning and Adaptation	Continuous procedural and strategic reflection	Adaptive capacity and resilience to delays

Table 4: *Challenges and mitigation strategies in the BPD Kaltimtara project*

Challenge Category	Specific Issues	Impact	Mitigation Strategy	Effectiveness
Regulatory Uncertainty	Land and zoning delays; AMDAL complexity	High	Scenario planning, political lobbying, and legal review	Moderate
Financial Risk	No state guarantees; market volatility	Moderate	Conservative budgeting; revenue diversification	High
Coordination Complexity	Multi-level governance fragmentation	Moderate	Monthly task force meetings; clear role definition	High
Social Acceptance	Community concerns; cultural sensitivity	Low	Public consultation; CSR programs; cultural integration	Under active management

antees and volatile market conditions. BPD addressed these challenges through conservative budgeting and diversification of revenue streams, ensuring financial sustainability and capital liquidity. Coordination complexity, arising from fragmented institutional mandates and informal communication channels, was effectively reduced through monthly task force meetings and the establishment of clear role definitions, which strengthened alignment and reduced transaction costs. Meanwhile, social acceptance challenges, though relatively low, were managed through participatory consultations, CSR initiatives, and the integration of local culture into the building's architectural design. Collectively, these mitigation strategies demonstrate that adaptive coordination, transparency, and stakeholder engagement can sustain trust and collaborative momentum even when formal regulatory clarity has not yet been achieved

Synthesis and theoretical implications

Overall, the implementation of the BPD Kaltimtara quasi-PPP provides empirical evidence that asymmetric governance models, when anchored in complementary capacities and adaptive coordination, can produce sustainable institutional outcomes even under incomplete regulatory regimes. The case operationalizes the ACG framework in a real-world context and extends collaborative governance theory by demonstrating how informal, trust-based mechanisms can substitute for formalized contractual structures. These findings contribute to PPP and governance literature by showing that asymmetry can be productive when actors share long-term strategic interests, cultivate institutional trust, and apply adaptive learning to navigate uncertainty. This insight holds particular relevance for decentralized governance systems and emerging economies undertaking large-scale, multi-level development projects such as Indonesia's IKN initiative

Discussion

The findings of this study affirm that the implementation of the BPD Kaltimtara Head Office project in Ibu Kota Nusantara (IKN) exemplifies a distinctive form of quasi-public–private partnership (quasi-PPP). This model emerged from a combination of regional political mandates, institutional capacity, and cross-sectoral collaboration. Unlike formal PPP schemes characterized by standardized regulation and contractual risk-sharing mechanisms, this quasi-PPP displayed flexibility and adaptability while remaining shaped by asymmetries in power, resources, and risk distribution among actors. The governance configuration that materialized in this project aligns with the concept of *asymmetric collaborative governance,* a model of collaboration that remains functional and productive despite unequal actor capacities and contributions. The East Kalimantan Provincial Government served as a policy broker and strategic facilitator, mediating the interests of BPD Kaltimtara, the IKN Authority, and third-party actors through informal and adaptive coordination mechanisms. This pattern reflects the *Collaborative Governance Framework* (Ansell & Gash, 2008), which emphasizes trust, mutual commitment, and facilitative leadership as key enablers of multi-actor collaboration. Meanwhile, BPD Kaltimtara acted as the core implementer, bearing full financial responsibility without fiscal support from either national or regional budgets. Drawing on *First Mover Advantage theory* (Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988), BPD's early engagement in IKN demonstrates strategic positioning to establish institutional influence before the formalization of regional governance structures. This proactive stance signals both financial risk tolerance and a symbolic assertion of regional ownership within a national strategic agenda. It also resonates with *Resource Dependency Theory* (Hillman *et al*., 2009), which suggests that resource dominance enhances bargaining power. However, in this case, financial strength was leveraged not for control but to accelerate collaboration and reinforce regional legitimacy within the IKN project. Despite these advances, the partnership remains constrained by regulatory ambiguity, particularly from the IKN Authority, which has yet to finalize project site designation and clarify the legal scope of regional participation. This dependency on a single regulatory decision has placed all stakeholders, including those fully prepared technically and financially, into a conditional holding pattern. Such conditions mirror the *coordination gaps* described in *Adaptive Governance Theory* (Ansell & Torfing, 2022; Folke *et al*., 2005), where local institutions compensate for absent top-down directives through informal arrangements and proactive role assumption. Third-party contractors and consultants, while technically prepared, operate under conditional readiness until regulatory confirmation is obtained. Their function extends beyond construction execution; they act as co-producers of public value by embedding cultural and sustainability principles into architectural design. Yet, delays in formal contracts and site approval have created latent costs and reduced efficiency within the collaboration network. From a financial perspective, the project's structure, where BPD assumes the entirety of investment risk, highlights the limitations of the quasi-PPP model when compared to classical PPP frameworks. As emphasized by Li *et al*. (2024), sustainable PPPs typically rely on proportional risk-sharing between the public and private sectors. The absence of such mechanisms exposes BPD to prolonged investment recovery periods and potential liquidity pressures. Without regulatory support or macro-level fiscal guarantees, the project's long-term financial sustainability may face challenges. Nonetheless, the partnership benefits from strong political and social legitimacy rooted in government endorsement and community support. Local stakeholders view the project as a symbol of regional participation in national development, generating optimism, reinforcing political legitimacy, and stimulating local economic activity. This represents a form of social license to operate, where legitimacy derives from public acceptance rather than regulatory authorization, supported by information transparency, consultation, and responsiveness to community expectations. These findings align with the place-based governance approach (Barca *et al*., 2012), emphasizing that local identity and social cohesion enhance project legitimacy and success. Through the lens of New Public Governance (NPG) (Osborne, 2010), the project illustrates a transition from hierarchical to networked governance characterized by flexible role distribution, multi-actor interdependence, and trust as central drivers of collaboration. Although formal governance structures for IKN remain incomplete, regional governments, BUMDs, the IKN Authority, private sector partners, and local communities each contribute distinct but complementary roles within a semi-formal collaborative framework. The sustainability of this partnership ultimately depends on the institutionalization of coordination mechanisms, including formalized forums, shared incentive systems, milestone-based contracts, and measurable performance indicators. Theoretically, these findings reinforce the relevance of the *Asymmetric Collaborative Governance (ACG)* model as an analytical framework for understanding strategic development partnerships in Indonesia. The model operationalizes five core principles: Complementary Asymmetry, Adaptive Coordination, Shared Value Creation, Flexible Accountability, and Iterative Trust Building, which were empirically demonstrated in this study. The BPD Kaltimtara IKN project thus provides a compelling example of how a quasi-PPP configuration rooted in institutional flexibility and local commitment can function effectively within unstable, multi-level governance systems. As such, it offers both conceptual insight and practical guidance for designing adaptive, trust-based governance frameworks in similarly complex regulatory and political environments

CONCLUSION

This study examined the implementation of the BPD Kaltimtara headquarters project in Indonesia's New Capital (IKN) as a pioneering quasi-public-private partnership (quasi-PPP) in a decentralized governance context. It aimed to describe actor collaboration patterns, assess adaptive coordination under regulatory uncertainty, and evaluate institutional trust, financial commitment, and project readiness. The findings demonstrate that this quasi-PPP represents a distinct institutional configuration departing from conventional PPP frameworks, yet capable of achieving substantial institutional progress despite regulatory and coordination constraints. The partnership was characterized by resource and authority asymmetries among the East Kalimantan Provincial Government, BPD Kaltimtara, the IKN Authority, and private contractors. Rather than hindering collaboration, these asymmetries functioned as strategic assets when aligned with the five principles of Asymmetric Collaborative Governance (ACG): Complementary Asymmetry, Adaptive Coordination, Shared Value Creation, Flexible Accountability, and Iterative Trust Building. The provincial government played a facilitative and legitimizing role, while BPD Kaltimtara acted as the primary investor, committing IDR 85 billion (8% of its annual capital budget) without state or regional fiscal guarantees. This configuration generated structural interdependence and mutual incentives, illustrating how asymmetric collaboration can produce cohesive institutional arrangements. Trust indices of (provincial government–BPD) and (IKN Authority–partnership) indicate substantial but differentiated confidence among actors. These results are consistent with collaborative governance thresholds identified by Ansell and Gash (2008), confirming that cooperation can remain effective despite power imbalances when built on long-term mutual reliability (Emerson *et al*., 2012). The partnership also operationalized Adaptive Coordination through the Tim Percepatan IKN Kaltim task force, which mitigated uncertainty via scenario-based planning and informal coordination consistent with adaptive governance literature (Folke *et al*., 2005; Ansell & Torfing, 2022). Comparatively, these findings diverge from conventional PPP models emphasizing proportional risk sharing and contractual safeguards (Li *et al*., 2024; Maqbool & Sridhar, 2024). Instead, the quasi-PPP configuration aligns more closely with the principles of state capitalism (Mazzucato, 2018; Musacchio & Lazzarini, 2014), in which public-sector institutions assume strategic investment leadership. This study thus demonstrates that relational trust and institutional complementarity can substitute for formal risk-allocation mechanisms in decentralized governance environments, contrasting with Maqbool and Sridhar's (2023) assertion that contractual safeguards are prerequisites for PPP sustainability. These results reinforce the New Public Governance perspective (Osborne, 2010), showing that institutional relationships and adaptive learning may sustain complex partnerships even when formal regulatory structures remain incomplete. The study's theoretical contribution lies in validating the ACG framework as a practical analytical lens for understanding asymmetric governance in emerging economies. Empirically, it provides evidence that subnational institutions can drive national strategic initiatives through complementary capacities, flexible coordination, and iterative trust building. Practically, the findings suggest that contextually designed quasi-PPP models can enhance legitimacy, resilience, and innovation in decentralized development settings. While the study is limited to a single pre-construction case, its insights offer direction for future comparative and longitudinal research exploring whether such institutional arrangements can sustain effectiveness through project implementation and operation phases. Ultimately, the BPD Kaltimtara IKN partnership illustrates that asymmetry, when strategically managed, can serve as a foundation for adaptive, legitimate, and enduring collaboration in complex governance systems

AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS

Elca Maradona conceptualized the research framework, led the data analysis, and drafted the main sections of the manuscript. Bonaventura Ngarawula contributed to the theoretical formulation of the Asymmetric Collaborative Governance (ACG) model, conducted literature synthesis, and supported data interpretation. Tommy Hariyanto coordinated field data collection, validated empirical findings through stakeholder consultations, and contributed to the final revision and editing of the manuscript. All authors discussed the results, reviewed the manuscript critically for intellectual content, and approved the final version for submission

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CONFLICT OF INTEREST

The authors declare no potential conflict of interest regarding the publication of this work. In addition, the ethical issues, including plagiarism, informed consent, misconduct, data fabrication and/or falsification, double publication and/or submission, and redundancy, have been completely witnessed by the authors.

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ABBREVIATIONS (NOMENCLATURE)

AMDAL	*Analisis Mengenai Dampak Lingkungan* (Environmental Impact Assessment)
APBD	*Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Daerah* (Regional Government Budget)
APBN	*Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara* (State Government Budget)
Bappeda	Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Daerah (Regional Development Planning Agency)
BPD	Bank Pembangunan Daerah (Regional Development Bank)
BUMD	Badan Usaha Milik Daerah (Regionally-Owned Enterprise)
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
IIGF	Indonesian Infrastructure Guarantee Fund
IKN	*Ibu Kota Nusantara* (Nusantara Capital City – Indonesia's New Capital)
MSME	Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprise
NPG	New Public Governance
PPP	Public–Private Partnership
Quasi–PPP	Quasi–Public–Private Partnership (Hybrid PPP model involving regional actors or state-owned entities)
RPJMN	*Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Nasional* (National Medium-Term Development Plan)
SOE	State-Owned Enterprise
SPV	Special Purpose Vehicle
VGF	Viability Gap Fund

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